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This paper aims at questioning the link between local finances and the economic dynamism of cities. 
This issue is based on the frequently stressed cases (by the media) of uncontrolled expenses of cities, increased 
level of local taxes and negative effects on local economics. This situation has been experimented in the cities of 
Briançon, Angoulême, and even in the little village of Eyne (Eastern Pyrenees) which had the biggest level of 
debt per inhabitant of the whole Europe in the beginning of the nineties. 
 
For all that, it is not obvious that firms and households may really be able to “vote with their feet”. For 
instance, there is no empirical evidence of the ability of households to punish any kind of drift in respect to 
Ricardo’s equivalence which would be at their expense. Very few people can actually forecast a future raise of 
tax burden due to increasing debts, and strategically choose their location thanks to rational economic 
computation.   
 
 Therefore, as a starting point,  the lack of neutral link between urban management and local attractive 
power of cities will be assumed. The relevance of the following assumptions will be considered :  
* assumption n°1  : the choice of the financial way to manage a city would positively influence 
economic dynamism, provided it would express the agreement with a “budgetary orthodoxy convention” 
(Thomas 1999). 
* assumption n°2 : conversely, local public management, insofar as it is based (notably) on debts and 
refers to what could be called a “keynesian convention” would negatively influence the attractive power of cities. 
 
  Thus, everything else equal, the more a city would be granted with important savings and internal cash 
flow, the more it could afford to finance it own investments (or increased investments with a given rate of self-
financing), the less debt service would lessen the functioning resources of the following year, etc … Moreover, a 
healthy financial management would improve the probability of a city to attract households and firms : if debts 
and local tax burden can be restricted to a low level (in respect to the national average level, to the one of close 
competing cities …), then this low yearly increase of local taxes would not seem to shackle the dynamics of 
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The empirical part of this paper deals with the test of the relevance of the previous assumptions. Our 
sample is composed with all the 324 cities of the French Department of Tarn. The specific features of this 
sample are : the important number of statistical observations, the fact that all the cities of a local level, between 
metropolitan areas and Regions, are considered, the diversity of environments (rural, urban, agriculture, industry, 
dynamic or depressed industrial sectors), high of low proximity with an European metropolitan area (Toulouse), 
… 
The attractive power of Tarn cities will be estimated by the increase (or decrease) of population. The 
assumptions will be tested thanks to ordinary least square regressions. The database includes budgetary variables 
(budgets of cities, resources,  expenses, savings, fiscal wealth, debts, investments, …), fiscal variables (local 
taxes, income tax, …)  and also distances from each city to Toulouse, expressed in kilometres and in time. The 
conclusions will be detailed in terms of local planning, by comparing the impact of distance to fiscal “fixed” 
costs. 
 
1 : Theoretical links between budgetary austerity and economic growth 
 
1.1  : The main current trends of French local public finances 
 
One of the main trends of current public funds, as to French cities, deals with the growing importance of 
self-financing, to the detriment of  debts. First, a few definitions about savings must be stressed, by translating 
the notions of French public accountants. Management savings is the difference between operating resources and 
operating expenses (that is every kind of management costs, except interest). Gross savings is the difference 
between management savings and interest. Finally, net savings is the difference between gross savings and 
writing off of capital, or also the difference between management savings and annual repayment (DGCL 2003).  
 
  Thus, from 1997 to 2000, gross savings increased, since resources grew faster than operating expenses. 
The gross savings of French cities amounts to 8 billions euros, in spite of a slight decrease in 2001, due to a 
higher raise of  public wages, and to the stabilization of debt service, after several consecutive years of  decrease
1  
(MINEFI 2003).  
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  Insofar as public wages represent the main part of cities’ operating expenses (almost 50% of operating 
expenses and nearly 33% of the global budget), it seems that the ability of cities to finance their investment 
expenses thanks to self financing merely depends on wages stalibilization. Thus, the more and more numerous 
transfers of competence and power from cities to metropolitan areas managed to lessen the ongoing growth of 
wages at the municipal level.   
 
Broadly speaking, the unavoidable controlled rise of wages and the lower amount of debt service (4,7% 
of budgets in 2003) resulted in the appearance of important cash flows : more than 38% of investment resources 
in 2001, versus only 29% for debts (MINEFI 2003). Moreover, this increasing self-financing, since 1996, made 
it possible for annual repayment to be higher than new debts. Therefore, degearing is growing, and amounted to 
30% of investment expenses in 2001. 
 
Accordingly, one of the most noticeable features of French cities and local public organisations is their       
amazing situation of financial surplus, as to Maastricht point of view, and the huge decrease of debts  (- 255 
millions euros in 2001), as expressed by the 5.5 average years of repayment ratio (Klopfer 2002). As a matter of 
fact, as investment resources are higher than application of funds, the ensued cash flow enables this degearing, as 
well as an increase of net current assets. Consequently, the overall liquidity of French cities is appreciable, since 
this working capital stands for a safety margin, even if liquidity requirements are negative.  
 
This specific and worthwhile situation resulted in a widely positive cash balance (9,1 billions euros in 
2001, which represents an average value of 40 days of expenses). This high level can notably be explained by the 
risk aversion of little cities : their investment per inhabitant is more important than the one of bigger cities, 
whereas their precarious financial position often oblige them to save operating surplus during several years, 
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1.2 : The arbitration between self-financing and debts 
 
Thus, the last twenty years have been characterized by degearing, most of all since 1997. Debts of 
French cities have actually been cut down from 9.1% of GDP in 1987 to 7.6% in 2001 (Hoorens 2003). Several 
reasons may acquaint us with this strategy of degearing, of self-financing rather than debt. Some of them refer to 
current circumstances, like the rise in price of bank financing, because of the growing detightening of  credit 
during the eighties. As a matter of fact, stopping reduced-rate loans of the C.D.C.
2, in an inflationary context, 
generated a dangerous rise of effective interest rates
3. This rise dissuaded cities from new debts as well as 
keeping previous ones, insofar as these former loans have mainly been contracted with fixed rates, which could 
result in an explosion of debt service. (Guengant 2002). Referring to financial leverage, it was relevant to choose 
equity capital rather than long-term liabilities.   
 
Nevertheless, this arbitration, which is in favour of self-financing, does not automatically imply a lower 
level of investment for French cities. Indeed, nearly 75% of French public investments are made at the local 
level. Cities’ investments markedly increased from the eighties to the beginning of the nineties, which is not 
paradoxical at all. When the economic situation is dynamic enough to generate a rise of tax bases, a lower level 
of gearing may lessen debt service, and grant cities with increasing cash flows. This double stimulating effect for 
savings (rise of operating resources, and lower expenses) allowed a higher level of local investments.  In such a 
specific context, financial orthodoxy, expressed by voluntarist degearing, started a virtuous circle of increased 
self-financing and investments. As mentioned by  Sallez & Vérot (1993 p. 156),  the cities with the heaviest 
burden of debt cause an outflow of investors, for their plans are retrained, which could prompt them to offer the 
lowest level of public services while increasing tax burden.  
 
Conversely, the partial drastic cut in municipal cash flows
4, as shown by tax losses due to an economic 
downturn in the early 90’, entailed an unprecedented stagnation of investments. The economic upturn at the end 
of the 90’ and the decrease of effective interest rates were compulsory for the recovery in cash flows and self-
financing rates.  
                                                           
2 Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (Deposit and Consignment Office) 
3 Formerly negative, because of low subsidized rates compared to a higher inflation. 
4 In this paper, we don’t deal with the evolution of State criteria to grant cities with subsidies, which obviously 
have an influence on cash flows. 
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Thus, this analysis of the links between investments and cash flows stresses a radical contextual 
change : the end of a strict and perfect connection between loans and investments. Cities henceforth choose to 
invest only if they have sufficient cash flow, which means that the resort to debts becomes a residual resource, 
only when savings is not high enough. Therefore debts go up and down because of financial “good news” or 
“bad news”, that is unexpected fiscal resources or expenses (Hoorens 2003). 
 
In a political and institutional point of view, restricting gearing for local public entities is legitimated by 
Maastricht criteria. Let us remind that they apply to every kind of public entities (State,  national health services 
and local administration). Thus, the French State cannot be accused of exporting its public deficit at the local 
level, by decentralising more and more tasks, since this strategy would not change the value of the deficit ratio  
(Guengant & Josselin 1999b). If we consider the chronic deficit of State and national health services, the careful 
management of French cities can hardly be challenged. As France and Germany currently don’t care with their 
deficit ratio, the financial surplus of local public entities (cities, metropolitans areas, « départements », regions) 
hopefully does not widen the overall deficit of public administration. One may notice that the first models of 
local management during the sixties laid on the same kind of rigorous rules : the main goal was to maintain 
annual repayment under 20% of operating resources
5 (Bouinot 1999). 
 
Moreover, even if the detightening of credit implied an easier resort to loans, we must remind that 
French cities are compelled to respect  a constraint of budgetary balance
6. As a matter of fact, any kind of 
upward drift is theoretically prohibited, since cities must have sufficient  management savings in order to 
guarantee annual repayment. Consequently, debts can only finance investments (they cannot be used for 
operating expenses, in no way). The fear of negative budgetary consequences of the decentralisation prompted 
cities to degearing, in order to lessen debt service
7. Thus, cities forecasted an ineluctable rise of operating costs 
and, at the same time, feared to be granted with additional insufficient subsidies. As a result, gearing is 
constrained by the ability of each city to generate sufficient cash flows. However, this ability may be restricted 
by uncontrolled costs (notably wages) or by a too large use of tax potential. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
5 The preliminary budgets of French cities in reveal an average value of 14%.  
6 As mentionned in the article L 1612-4 of the « Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales » (CGCT). 
7 The decrease of debt service is one of the main budgetary trend of the last decade : from 9.1 billions € in 1993 
to 5.5 billions € in 2001. Olivier THOMAS        Do local public finances influence the economic growth of cities ?   ERSA 2004 Porto 
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Moreover, municipal cash flows first grew following the deindexation of wages to prices, whereas they 
shifted during the last three years, as the division of value added becomes again in favour of wages. In this 
context of lower management savings, the growth of gross savings merely depends on the lessening of debt 
service.   
 
Finally, several psychological effects must be pointed out. They are linked to the appearance of the first 
cases of  insolvency in a few French cities, like Angoulême. Their negative influence results from the 
unfortunate publicity that has been earned because of various above-the-line media, as they issued debt rankings. 
These new public tools enabled fast and easy inter-cities comparisons. They have naturally been integrated to the 
financial communication of virtuous cities, which induced a negative and “pathological” prejudice against 
indebted cities. Was it possible for local authorities, in such an environment, to be proud of a deliberate running 
into debt ? 
 
All these reasons suggest that the current environment is in favour of financial orthodoxy and 
degearing, rather than a kind of «  keynesian  » policy based on indebtedness and public deficits. However, 
numerous contributions in the economic literature aim at challenging this idea. How can this opposite 
assumption be contended ? 
 
1.3  : Which theoretical justifications  for debt? 
 
As a starting point, one could argue that the recovery of a positive leverage casts in a new light the 
question of arbitration between debt and taxes, in other words the balance between current and future local 
taxpayers. Thus, according to Klopfer (2002 page 76), we should run into debt if future surtax (so that annual 
repayment can be guaranteed) is inferior to the one currently needed if there is no additional debt. Therefore, it 
means that debt is a better solution whenever tax bases are dynamic enough. Nevertheless, two objections must 
be raised.  
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 First, the lifeless economic situation and the development of various tax cuts
8 don’t foresee any good 
coming from the dynamism of tax bases. Return on investments can hardly and scarcely be expected. Indeed,  
creating an industrial park is quite different from building a stadium, for instance. Accordingly, investments 
featured by low returns should rather be financed by equity capital, in order to protect oneself from higher rates. 
Indeed, these investments will generate few additional tax bases, whereas these latter would have been 
compulsory for annual repayment.  
 
Secondly, it is not an obligation to question the dilemma “future taxes versus current debt ». Important 
cash flows can be made thanks to a rigorous and healthy management, and they may be high enough to finance 
new investments
9. Thus we may emphasize that big cash flows don’t imply the rise of tax burden, whereas 
interventionists often advocate this «implicit» idea.  
 
One could object on the one hand that these virtuous circles concern only few cities, and on the other 
hand that local taxpayers would rather benefit immediately from such a good management, thanks to lower taxes 
(and then new debts). Local taxpayers (who are also electors) would fatally blame the strategy of maximizing 
cash flows. They would accuse local authorities of forecasting excessive tax burden, and induly collecting 
private incomes for public investment. Klopfer (2002 page  76), while advocating an “intelligent debt 
management”, underlines the possibility for rational citizens, with perfect information, to invest cities’ excessive 
savings on money market funds. However, it seems that such expectations and economic computation don’t 
exist, since average citizens are unable to have rational expectations and even to understand the whole 
complexity of the imperfect information they are granted with. Besides, this solution is all the less relevant as 
local taxpayers used to consume fiscal grants instead of laying them aside.
10 
 
Therefore, degearing is not fatally linked to higher tax burden. Contrary to the idea stressed by Hoorens 
(2003 page 182), degearing does not entail any loss of room to manœuvre
11. Finally, several authors argue that 
debts should be used to recover the perfect matching of new assets and new debts. However, this perfect 
symmetry between lives of assets and liabilities  merely aims at improving the level of net current assets. 
                                                           
8 Which reduces the financial autonomy of local authorities, as mentionned by Gilbert (2003). 
9 Like the city or Toulouse, where noticeable self financing and investments can be observed for many years, in 
spite of the stability of effective tax rates. 
10 Moreover this is the basic assumption of keynesian policies, which raises a new arbitration, between public 
and private consumption. But this problem goes beyond our paper. Olivier THOMAS        Do local public finances influence the economic growth of cities ?   ERSA 2004 Porto 
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Nevertheless, as previously pointed out, French cities have already accumulated substantial net current assets. 
Moreover, promoting cash flows amounts to increase internal resources, that is the level of net current assets. 
 
  On a theoretical point of view, cyclical and structural arguments seem to confirm the relevance of our 
initial assumption. The following empirical analysis intends to question this relevance more precisely, by using a 
statistical model for the cities included in the Tarn department.   
 
2 : The case of the cities in the Tarn department 
 
2.1 : Determination of sample and variables 
 
The sample includes all the 324 cities of the Tarn department and can be featured by : an important 
number of statistical individuals, the exhaustive population at this spatial level, between metropolitan areas and 
Regions, with urban, peripheral, rural, industrial, agricultural environments,  various sizes of cities (from 20 to  
70000 inhabitants), different levels of proximity with the fourth French city (Toulouse), dynamic and declining 
industries, …  
 
The economic appeal of Tarn cities will be considered in terms of  population
12 (with logarithmic 
values), of increase in population, as well as gross professional tax bases
13. Our assumptions will be tested with 
ordinary least squares regressions. Several kinds of variables will be entered in the models : budgetary variables 
(each part of preliminary budgets of cities, operating and investment expenses, resources, cash flows, savings, 
fiscal wealth, debts, …) fiscal variables (local taxes, income tax), distances from each city to Toulouse 
(expressed in kilometres and in time). We must underline that the value of each budgetary variable will be 
considered per inhabitant, in order to get rid of the influence of size
14. We expect to confirm the two initial 
assumptions as well as the existence of a negative influence of the distance variable.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 The link between the variation of fiscal rates and gearing will be considered in the empiric part. 
12 Data are available for 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990 & 2001 
13 This is the common proxy variable for local GDP, with a two-years lag, even if this correlation is not anymore 
as high as it used to be (almost 99%), as underlined by Bouinot (1999). However, these tax bases won’t be 
directly used in this paper, because they appear to be strongly correlated with population (98%).  
14 Thus whenever we talk about  « outstanding debt », for instance, it means  “outstanding debt per inhabitant » 
…. This applies to each budgetary variable. Olivier THOMAS        Do local public finances influence the economic growth of cities ?   ERSA 2004 Porto 
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The 48 variables of the sample include various indexes which have been previously emphasized by the 
economic literature about local finances, scoring, and even by the French law about local administration, called 
ATR
15 (for the ATR law compels cities to issue 11 ratios).  These main variables are : 
- operating expenses per inhabitant (ATR law, Taïrou 1999) 
- operating resources per inhabitant (ATR law, Taïrou 1999) 
- gross savings per inhabitant, as a proxy for cash flow (Guengant 1999) 
- management savings / operating resources : index of performance (Serve 2002) 
- local taxes per inhabitant (ATR law) 
- fiscal resources / operating resources : ratio of financial autonomy (Serve 2002) 
- local taxes / tax potential : room to manœuvre (Thomas 1999, ATR law) 
- investment per inhabitant (ATR law) 
- outstanding debt per inhabitant (ATR law, Capeci 1991) 
- annual repayment per inhabitant (Thomas 1999, Sallez & Vérot 1993) 
- outstanding debt / operating resources : debt ratio (ATR law, Serve 2002)  
- debt service / operating resources : importance of debt (Serve 2002) 
- wages per inhabitant : proxy for the size of cities and budgets 
- wages / operating expenses (ATR law) 
- investments / operating resources (ATR law) 
- debt / gross savings : repayment ratio (Guengant & Josselin 1999a,) 
- taxable income per inhabitant (Capeci 1991) 
- gross savings/ investments : self-financing ratio (Taïrou 1999, Thomas 1999) 
- bases and rates of  land tax, poll tax and professional tax  
- former increases in population : proxy for inertia (Thomas 1999) 
- kilometre and time
16 distance to Toulouse (Thomas 1999)
17 
- connection to the A68 highway, between Albi and Toulouse (dummy variable)
18 
                                                           
15 Law n°125 in 1992. ATR stands for “Administration Territoriale de la République”. 
16 Time distance has been computed by choosing, for each city, the « best » travel, that is to say the faster. An 
average speed of 60km/h has been used for «départementales” et “communales” roads, 90km/h for national 
roads and 130km/h for highways. 
17 Thomas (1999) refered to institutional rather than geographic distance. This distance was computed thanks to a 
vector distance of the productive structure of the 210 main French cities with the one of Paris. 
18 The value « 1 » is given to cities located closer than 10 to 12 kilometres away from a highway access. This 
interval takes the time distance to the highway access into account: less than10 km for the cities connected with a 
rather rural road, 12 km for faster travels). Olivier THOMAS        Do local public finances influence the economic growth of cities ?   ERSA 2004 Porto 
  11
 
Several initial statements can be emphasized, as to the correlations between variables. First of all, three 
sets of variables reveal noticeable internal correlations :  
- variables about gearing, indebtedness, debt service, annual repayment, outstanding debt, repayment 
ratio. Insofar as a positive link between growth and degearing is expected, the analysis will select the variable of 
repayment. 
- variables accounting for the amount of the budget, for a « size » influence (and correlated with size, 
even for their « per inhabitant » value) : sum of operating expenses, of operating resources, wages, debt service, 
local taxes, tax potential :  wages will be selected because of their prevailing importance in budgets; local taxes 
(in percentage of resources) will also be integrated, as proxies for budgetary autonomy. 
 - variables standing for transportation costs and the role of  distance : kilometre and time distance to 
Toulouse, connection to the A 68 highway : as the variable « connection A68 » appears to be significant, time 
distance will rather be considered 
 
2.2 : Main results 
 
  In addition to this preliminary compulsory selection, several interesting correlations may be stressed, as 
they implicitly refer to the previous theoretical analysis. This correlation is : 
-  negative between time distance to Toulouse and connection to A68 (- 49.5%) 
-  negative between average taxable income and distance to Toulouse (- 42.9%) 
-  negative between investments and debt service (- 40.9%), annual repayment (-57.1%)… 
-  negative between net current assets and debt service (-28.6%), annual repayment (-27.8%), … 
-  positive between net current assets and investments (+ 16.4%) 
-  positive between investments and cash flows (+48.6%), … 
-  repayments are weekly linked to variations of fiscal rates (see note n°11) : +16% with professional tax 
rate versus  – 4%
19 with poll tax rate. 
-  we confirm that investment per inhabitant is negatively linked to population (-5.2% ) 
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Thus, this first analysis accounts for trends which are consistent with our assumption of budgetary 
orthodoxy : investments and cash flows decrease when debt is higher, which illustrates current economic trends 
(Hoorens 2003). Repayments, as debt service will decrease, enable the existence of higher cash flows and/or 
higher investments. Besides, the economic growth of the Tarn cities seems to keep anchored in an environment 
merely featured by spatial inertia, as shown by the prevailing importance of the proximity to Toulouse.  
 
The following models have confirmed our preliminary assumptions. Several equations have been computed, 
with different aggregates : logarithm of populations on the one hand (stocks) and variations in population on the 
other hand (flows). All of these equations respect the main basic assumptions of OLS  : normal and 
homoscedastic residuals, lack of collinearity, of outliers, of autocorrelated errors ...  The following tables sum up 
the main results. 
 
(1) 
         R
2 = 48.8% 
(2) 
R
2 = 48.9% 
(3) 
R
2 = 49.1% 
Dependent variable : 
varpop82-01 
 non standardised coefficient B (standardised coefficients Bêta) 
Constant 
 
-110.013 -26.209 -159.964 
Variation population 
1975-1982 
0.852 (0.582)  0.864 (0.590) 
 
0.856 (0.585) 
Connection A 68 
 
266.764 (0.341)  240.166 (0.307)  245.124 (0.325) 
Average taxable income 
 
9.855




0.404 (0.068)     
Average poll tax base  
 
  0.195 (0.130)  0.139 (0.092) 
Time distance Toulouse 
 
 -1.260  (-0.089)  
 




Non standardised coefficients  Standardised 
coefficients 


















E-3 0.001  0.470  10.858 0.618 
Local taxes % resources 
 
3.381
E-2 0.004  0.338  8.707  0.768 
Variation  rate prof. tax 
 
4.672
E-2 0.008  0.224  5.707  0.755 
Time distance Toulouse 
 
-9.415




E-4 0.000  -0.151  -3.858  0.762 
Repayment 3.175
E-3 0.001  0.119  3.128 
 
0.797 
Management savings % 
operating resources 
8.749
E-3 0.003  0.095  2.610  0.877 
Local taxes / tax potential  
 
-4.235
E-3 0.002  -0.092  -2.280  0.707 
Connection A 68 
 
0.285 0.148 0.082 1.931  0.650 
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  The model using population as a proxy for growth accounts for approximately 64% of the variability of 
this aggregate.  Variables have been selected, in each model, by a stepwise method. All of them are significant at 
the error level of  5% (except 10% for one variable). Coefficients mainly confirm our initial assumptions. Thus, a 
negative linked can be observed between the dependent variable and three independent variables : the time 
distance to Toulouse, investments and the ratio between local taxes and tax potential. Consequently, the 
dissuasive influence of locations far away from Toulouse can be emphasized, as well as the too important 
recourse to local fiscal wealth, which reveals to lessening of budgetary degrees of freedom. As to investments, of 
course we don’t contend that they shackle economic growth. The negative link merely confirms that little cities 
invest more per inhabitant than bigger cities.  
 
  On the opposite, population is positively linked to the other variables, that is to say connection to 
highway (better accessibility),  savings ratio and repayments (budgetary orthodoxy), the share of local taxes in 
operating resources (budgetary autonomy of cities), as well as wages (standing for the structural effect of 
budgetary size of cities). It is interesting to notice that this latter variable has the highest standardised coefficient, 
and has been integrated in the first rank by stepwise method, since its link with population is the strongest.  
Thus, a foreseeable limit may be detailed : it is not surprising to stress a parallelism between the size of cities 
(even with logarithmic values) and budgets per inhabitant.  
 
  This key importance of inertia, which was the prevailing variable explaining the growth of the French 
biggest cities during the last two decades (Thomas 1999),  is more clearly and less trivially expressed thanks to 
the three other equations (dependent variable : variations in population). These equations have an average R
2 of 
approximately 50%. All of them underline the determining influence of inertia. Thus, variations in population 
during the last twenty years merely reproduce the evolutions of the seven previous years.  
 
This homogeneity is all the more noticeable that it is not specific to the main French cities, which used 
to illustrate the stability of the rank-size law, from century to century. This feature actually applies to various 
kinds of economic environments. Some of them have been weakened by the declining activities, which were 
strongly anchored (textile industries and mines, notably), some of them are composed with more dynamic 
activities (pharmacy, farm-produce industries…). Other places hardly bear an increasing enclosing, whereas 
cities located close to the highway (the first forty kilometres near Toulouse) are getting more and more included Olivier THOMAS        Do local public finances influence the economic growth of cities ?   ERSA 2004 Porto 
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Beyond this prevailing inertia, the positive impact of accessibility (negative sign for time distance and 
positive sign for highway connection), of restricted gearing (positive sign for repayments) can once more be 
emphasised. Moreover, inertia is also indirectly expressed by the two following variables, standing for a « wealth 




To sum up, variations in population would be all the stronger that they would reinforce previous 
agglomerative dynamics, that the connection to Toulouse would be easier, that the average fiscal wealth would 
be more important, and finally that local public management would refer to a convention of budgetary 
orthodoxy. Therefore, the analysis of the cities belonging to the Tarn department confirms our initial 
assumptions. However, one may wonder whether these results may also apply to :   
 
* other samples at the same spatial level :  what about the influence of variables which have not been taken 
into account, like notably the job functional structure ? Our results relating to the Tarn should be compared to 
other departments with similar (Tarn et Garonne) or different (Rhône) features. 
 
* other aggregates standing for economic dynamism (jobs, skilled jobs, …) : are the results still the same ? 
Do debts and local taxes influence employment ? Do public policies differently influence firms and households ?  
 
* other spatial levels, by dealing with more urban environments, with strategic relations within cities, with 
cities belonging to the same metropolitan area




                                                           
20 Like the Champollion University, notably located in two cities in the Tarn (Albi and Castres). 
21 And sharing the same professional tax resources. 
22 «Grand Toulouse » includes Toulouse and cities at the northern, eastern and western part of the metropolitan 
area. “Sicoval” is another public entity, gathering various dynamic cities located in the southern part of the area 
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Annexes 
Récapitulatif du modèle j
,592a ,350 ,348 ,9698 ,350 173,454 1 322 ,000
,697b ,485 ,482 ,8642 ,135 84,482 1 321 ,000
,737c ,543 ,539 ,8157 ,058 40,303 1 320 ,000
,768d ,590 ,585 ,7742 ,047 36,253 1 319 ,000
,780e ,608 ,602 ,7582 ,018 14,593 1 318 ,000
,786f ,618 ,611 ,7490 ,011 8,873 1 317 ,003
,791g ,626 ,618 ,7428 ,007 6,301 1 316 ,013
,795h ,631 ,622 ,7384 ,006 4,763 1 315 ,030




















Changement dans les statistiques
Durbin-W
atson
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel a. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits b. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP c. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP, temps toulouse d. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois
d'investissement
e. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois
d'investissement, Remboursement d'emprunts
f. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois
d'investissement, Remboursement d'emprunts, épargne de gestion en % des pdts de fonctionnement
g. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois
d'investissement, Remboursement d'emprunts, épargne de gestion en % des pdts de fonctionnement, produit de la fisca directe / potentiel fiscal
h. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits, variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois
d'investissement, Remboursement d'emprunts, épargne de gestion en % des pdts de fonctionnement, produit de la fisca directe / potentiel fiscal,
connexion A68
i. 
Variable dépendante : ln population 2001 j. 
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ANOVA j
163,139 1 163,139 173,454 ,000a
302,852 322 ,941
465,991 323
226,238 2 113,119 151,453 ,000b
239,753 321 ,747
465,991 323
253,057 3 84,352 126,765 ,000c
212,934 320 ,665
465,991 323
274,786 4 68,697 114,611 ,000d
191,205 319 ,599
465,991 323
283,176 5 56,635 98,515 ,000e
182,815 318 ,575
465,991 323
288,154 6 48,026 85,607 ,000f
177,838 317 ,561
465,991 323
291,630 7 41,661 75,504 ,000g
174,361 316 ,552
465,991 323
294,227 8 36,778 67,448 ,000h
171,764 315 ,545
465,991 323









































des carrés ddl Carré moyen F Signification
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel a. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits b. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP
c. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP, temps toulouse
d. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois d'investissement
e. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois d'investissement, Remboursement
d'emprunts
f. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois d'investissement, Remboursement
d'emprunts, épargne de gestion en % des pdts de fonctionnement
g. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois d'investissement, Remboursement
d'emprunts, épargne de gestion en % des pdts de fonctionnement, produit de la fisca
directe / potentiel fiscal
h. 
Valeurs prédites : (constantes), Charges de personnel, impôts locaux % produits,
variation taux TP, temps toulouse, total des emplois d'investissement, Remboursement
d'emprunts, épargne de gestion en % des pdts de fonctionnement, produit de la fisca
directe / potentiel fiscal, connexion A68
i. 
Variable dépendante : ln population 2001 j. 
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Coefficients a
4,938 ,093 53,038 ,000
7,505E-03 ,001 ,592 13,170 ,000 ,592 ,592 ,592 1,000 1,000
3,972 ,134 29,673 ,000
6,076E-03 ,001 ,479 11,442 ,000 ,592 ,538 ,458 ,914 1,094
3,846E-02 ,004 ,385 9,191 ,000 ,525 ,456 ,368 ,914 1,094
3,927 ,127 31,032 ,000
4,813E-03 ,001 ,380 8,926 ,000 ,592 ,446 ,337 ,790 1,266
4,020E-02 ,004 ,402 10,154 ,000 ,525 ,494 ,384 ,910 1,099
5,396E-02 ,009 ,258 6,348 ,000 ,415 ,334 ,240 ,862 1,160
4,689 ,174 26,881 ,000
5,591E-03 ,001 ,441 10,592 ,000 ,592 ,510 ,380 ,743 1,347
3,510E-02 ,004 ,351 9,115 ,000 ,525 ,455 ,327 ,866 1,155
5,680E-02 ,008 ,272 7,028 ,000 ,415 ,366 ,252 ,859 1,164
-1,45E-02 ,002 -,228 -6,021 ,000 -,138 -,319 -,216 ,899 1,113
4,752 ,172 27,689 ,000
5,962E-03 ,001 ,470 11,335 ,000 ,592 ,536 ,398 ,717 1,394
3,468E-02 ,004 ,347 9,191 ,000 ,525 ,458 ,323 ,865 1,156
5,370E-02 ,008 ,257 6,750 ,000 ,415 ,354 ,237 ,850 1,176
-1,23E-02 ,002 -,194 -5,094 ,000 -,138 -,275 -,179 ,850 1,176
-5,06E-04 ,000 -,142 -3,820 ,000 -,097 -,209 -,134 ,892 1,121
4,755 ,170 28,045 ,000
5,536E-03 ,001 ,436 10,272 ,000 ,592 ,500 ,356 ,667 1,500
3,242E-02 ,004 ,324 8,521 ,000 ,525 ,432 ,296 ,831 1,204
5,263E-02 ,008 ,252 6,689 ,000 ,415 ,352 ,232 ,849 1,178
-1,22E-02 ,002 -,192 -5,090 ,000 -,138 -,275 -,177 ,850 1,177
-5,56E-04 ,000 -,156 -4,215 ,000 -,097 -,230 -,146 ,877 1,140
3,068E-03 ,001 ,115 2,979 ,003 ,378 ,165 ,103 ,804 1,244
4,516 ,193 23,363 ,000
5,786E-03 ,001 ,456 10,642 ,000 ,592 ,514 ,366 ,644 1,552
3,344E-02 ,004 ,335 8,811 ,000 ,525 ,444 ,303 ,821 1,218
5,439E-02 ,008 ,260 6,943 ,000 ,415 ,364 ,239 ,842 1,188
-1,31E-02 ,002 -,205 -5,443 ,000 -,138 -,293 -,187 ,832 1,202
-6,02E-04 ,000 -,169 -4,559 ,000 -,097 -,248 -,157 ,860 1,163
2,952E-03 ,001 ,111 2,887 ,004 ,378 ,160 ,099 ,802 1,247
8,472E-03 ,003 ,092 2,510 ,013 -,159 ,140 ,086 ,883 1,132
4,641 ,201 23,139 ,000
6,021E-03 ,001 ,475 10,925 ,000 ,592 ,524 ,374 ,620 1,613
3,506E-02 ,004 ,351 9,118 ,000 ,525 ,457 ,312 ,790 1,265
5,023E-02 ,008 ,241 6,266 ,000 ,415 ,333 ,214 ,794 1,259
-1,22E-02 ,002 -,192 -5,060 ,000 -,138 -,274 -,173 ,811 1,233
-5,05E-04 ,000 -,142 -3,646 ,000 -,097 -,201 -,125 ,772 1,295
3,065E-03 ,001 ,115 3,012 ,003 ,378 ,167 ,103 ,800 1,250
8,261E-03 ,003 ,090 2,461 ,014 -,159 ,137 ,084 ,882 1,133
-4,07E-03 ,002 -,089 -2,182 ,030 ,035 -,122 -,075 ,708 1,412
4,523 ,209 21,648 ,000
5,966E-03 ,001 ,470 10,858 ,000 ,592 ,522 ,370 ,618 1,618
3,381E-02 ,004 ,338 8,707 ,000 ,525 ,441 ,297 ,768 1,301
4,672E-02 ,008 ,224 5,707 ,000 ,415 ,307 ,194 ,755 1,324
-9,42E-03 ,003 -,148 -3,349 ,001 -,138 -,186 -,114 ,594 1,684
-5,36E-04 ,000 -,151 -3,858 ,000 -,097 -,213 -,131 ,762 1,312
3,175E-03 ,001 ,119 3,128 ,002 ,378 ,174 ,107 ,797 1,254
8,749E-03 ,003 ,095 2,610 ,009 -,159 ,146 ,089 ,877 1,140
-4,23E-03 ,002 -,092 -2,280 ,023 ,035 -,128 -,078 ,707 1,415





impôts locaux % produits
(constante)
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Diagnostic des observations a
-3,526 5,63 8,2236 -2,5923








Variable dépendante : ln population 2001 a. 
 
Statistiques des résidus a
3,7087 9,8944 5,9379 ,9577 324
-2,328 4,131 ,000 1,000 324
5,654E-02 ,4594 ,1202 4,728E-02 324
3,7350 9,7667 5,9438 ,9625 324
-4,7037 1,5908 -1,40E-15 ,7249 324
-6,397 2,164 ,000 ,986 324
-6,854 2,221 -,004 1,013 324
-5,3998 1,6757 -5,97E-03 ,7673 324
-7,421 2,235 -,006 1,028 324
,913 125,101 8,972 10,359 324
,000 ,695 ,006 ,041 324














Bras de levier centré
Minimum Maximum Moyenne Ecart-type N




Diagramme gaussien P-P de régression de Résidu standardisé 
Variable dépendante: ln population 2001 
Probabilité cumulée observée
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Nuage de points
Variable dépendante : ln population 2001
Régression Prévision ajustée
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